Signaling game

Results: 128



#Item
51False Modesty: When Disclosing Good News Looks Bad∗ Rick Harbaugh Indiana University  Dr. Theodore To

False Modesty: When Disclosing Good News Looks Bad∗ Rick Harbaugh Indiana University Dr. Theodore To

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Source URL: kelley.iu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2009-01-16 10:56:16
52Persuasion by Cheap Talk By A RCHISHMAN C HAKRABORTY AND R ICK H ARBAUGH We consider the credibility, persuasiveness, and informativeness of multidimensional cheap talk by an expert to a decision maker. We find that an e

Persuasion by Cheap Talk By A RCHISHMAN C HAKRABORTY AND R ICK H ARBAUGH We consider the credibility, persuasiveness, and informativeness of multidimensional cheap talk by an expert to a decision maker. We find that an e

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Source URL: kelley.iu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2012-11-28 13:43:39
53Signs and Symbolic Behavior Peter Godfrey-Smith Philosophy Program, The Graduate Center City University of New York  Presented at Symbols, Signals and the Archaeological Record, a workshop

Signs and Symbolic Behavior Peter Godfrey-Smith Philosophy Program, The Graduate Center City University of New York Presented at Symbols, Signals and the Archaeological Record, a workshop

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Source URL: petergodfreysmith.com

Language: English - Date: 2013-08-14 09:34:19
54Costly Signaling and Cooperation Herbert Gintis Eric Smith Samuel Bowles∗ July 17, 2001

Costly Signaling and Cooperation Herbert Gintis Eric Smith Samuel Bowles∗ July 17, 2001

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Source URL: www.umass.edu

Language: English - Date: 2001-07-17 20:12:32
55C:�iles�nalling�ms.I�msd.finalAER.wpd

C:ilesnallingms.Imsd.finalAER.wpd

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Source URL: www.econ.ohio-state.edu

Language: English - Date: 2011-12-15 19:09:29
56Lessons Learned: Generalizing Learning Across Games David J. Cooper and John H. Kagel* This paper synthesizes findings from an ongoing research program on learning in signaling games. The present paper focuses on cross-g

Lessons Learned: Generalizing Learning Across Games David J. Cooper and John H. Kagel* This paper synthesizes findings from an ongoing research program on learning in signaling games. The present paper focuses on cross-g

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Source URL: www.econ.ohio-state.edu

Language: English - Date: 2011-12-15 19:09:29
57Microsoft PowerPoint - understate-G604.ppt

Microsoft PowerPoint - understate-G604.ppt

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Source URL: kelley.iu.edu

Language: English - Date: 2008-09-19 10:16:03
58ON THE COEVOLUTION OF BASIC ARITHMETIC LANGUAGE AND KNOWLEDGE JEFFREY A. BARRETT Abstract. Skyrms-Lewis sender-receiver games with invention allow one to model how a simple mathematical language might be invented and bec

ON THE COEVOLUTION OF BASIC ARITHMETIC LANGUAGE AND KNOWLEDGE JEFFREY A. BARRETT Abstract. Skyrms-Lewis sender-receiver games with invention allow one to model how a simple mathematical language might be invented and bec

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Source URL: www.imbs.uci.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-11-04 13:08:56
59Draft JanLearning to Signal with Two Kinds of Trial and Error Brian Skyrms 1. Low Rationality Game Theory

Draft JanLearning to Signal with Two Kinds of Trial and Error Brian Skyrms 1. Low Rationality Game Theory

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Source URL: www.imbs.uci.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-11-04 13:01:47
60Emergence of a Signaling Network with “Probe and Adjust”

Emergence of a Signaling Network with “Probe and Adjust”

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Source URL: www.imbs.uci.edu

Language: English - Date: 2014-11-04 13:01:44